bases in no fewer than five neighbouring countries: Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola, Botswana and Zambia. To meet this threat there were eight RhAF squadrons: No I Squadron with nine Hunters and six Vampire FR.9s; No 2 Squadron with four Vampire T.55s (in the training role, but also with a strike capability); No 3 Squadron with four Islanders, a DC-7C and thirteen C-47s for transport duties; No 4 Squadron with seventeen Reims 337s and six Trojans for light attack and forward air control; No 5 Squadron with eight Canberra B.2sfT.4s, and Nos 6, 7 and 8 Squadrons with a variety of light transport, liaison and training types which could also be used in some war roles.
In addition to the weaponry described above, the Hunters were armed with their standard 30—mm gun packs and 68-mm SNEB rockets. In action, they were employed in concert with other strike aircraft. and the RhAF devised some highly effective tactics in carrying out anti-guerrilla operations. For operations against terrorist camps inside Rhodesia the RhAF”s light attack aircraft and armed helicopters would be mostly used: Hunters and Canberras would only be called in if the target was strongly defended. In attacks on targets outside Rhodesia, however, the Hunters and Canberras used their various weapons with devastating effect. For example, between IN and 20 October 1978 the RhAF made three attacks against ZIPRA camps at Westlands Farm, Mkushi and Rufunsa, all in Zambia; these raids were in response to the shooting down of an Air Rhodesia Viscount airliner by an SA-7 missile on 3 September 1978, and the massacre of most of the survivors by ZIPRA terrorists, In this attack — as in others made on targets outside Rhodesia — the Hunters went in first, approaching at high level (around 20,000 feet) and then throttling back to approach the target in a long dive before releasing their Golf Bombs. This was followed by a low-level Canberra attack using Alpha Bombs. Lastly, Alouette III gunships known as ‘K-cars’ circled the camp, strafing with door- mounted 20-mm cannon. In this particular attack, at a conservative estimate, 1,500 terrorists were killed in the three camps. Two previous attacks, both into Mozambique in August 1974 and November 1977, in which similar tactics were used, resulted in 300 and 1,200 terrorist dead respectively.
The appearance of the SA-7 shoulder- launched missile in terrorist hands forced the Hunter pilots to adopt similar tactics to those employed by SOAF. However, no Rhodesian Hunter was lost to a missile; the two Hunters that failed to return in the course of the war fell to AAA and small- arms fire.
Flechettes were used only on two occasions during the anti-guerrilla Operations, being introduced only towards the end of hostilities. One attack was made at night, the aiming point being marked by flares sent up by a Rhodesian Special Air Service patrol; the other was a daylight strike against a cell of twenty-six terrorists, and on that occasion the flechettes killed sixteen of them, including some key members of the ZANLA general staff.
In 1980, following the establishment of the new nation of Zimbabwe Air Force Hunter losses were made good to some extent by the purchase of the five FGA.80s from Kenya; the RAF also provided two refurbished Canberras. This brought the number of Hunters on
